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Temkin: Negligent Referral

CAN NEGLIGENT REFERRAL TO ANOTHER
ATTORNEY CONSTITUTE LEGAL
MALPRACTICE?
Barry R. Temkin'
I. INTRODUCTION
Is there tort liability in malpractice for the negligent
referral of an attorney? Every lawyer has occasion to refer a case
to another attorney or firm. The reasons are myriad: the need for
referral could arise due to a conflict of interest, the need for a
specialist outside of the expertise of the referring attorney or his
firm or the need to commence litigation in a foreign jurisdiction.
The prospective client may be unable to meet the referring
attorney's fee structure or the referring attorney may simply not
practice in the area in which the prospective client requires
counsel.
The referring attorney may seek to play a role in
representing the prospective client, but may be required by
professionalism considerations to retain or consult with a
specialist in order to secure adequate representation for the
prospective client. 2 Disciplinary Rule 6-101 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility implies the need for referrals under
certain circumstances by providing that a lawyer shall not
"handle a legal matter which the lawyer knows or should know
that he or she is not competent to handle, without associating with
a lawyer who is competent to handle it."3 Similarly the Code's
Ethical Considerations suggest that a lawyer "should accept
employment only in matters which he or she is or intends to
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2 See, e.g. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR6-101, codified as

223 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.30 (McKinney's 1992 & Supp. 2001).
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become competent to handle. "4 The Ethical Considerations
further state that: "a lawyer generally should not accept
employment5 in any area of the law in which he or she is not
qualified."
Of course, every lawyer has been at social functions or
other situations at which a prospective client has requested legal
advice in an area outside of the attorney's competence or field of
practice. While some of us can resist the temptation to venture
an opinion in uncharted legal waters, it is harder still to avoid
making a referral to a colleague who may be in a position to
render assistance to the prospective client. Indeed, Canon 2 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that, "A lawyer
should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make
legal counsel available." 6 Thus, it is apparent that the Code
tends to reinforce the natural human tendency to help other
people, if not directly, then indirectly by the recommendation of
a specialist who can.7
But if a lawyer undertakes to assist a lay person in
retaining counsel, does that lawyer thereby become responsible
for the results of the receiving attorney's representation? If a
bankruptcy specialist refers a personal injury case to his law
school roommate, is he thereby liable for money damages if his
erstwhile roommate proceeds to overlook the relevant statute of
limitations, or otherwise commits malpractice?
Does referring counsel have any duty to investigate the
background, moral character and competence of the attorney she
selects to assist the prospective client?
What if the client
4 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

EC 6-1 (McKinney's 1992 &

Supp. 2001).

5 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

EC 6-3 (McKinney's 1992 &

Supp. 2001).
6

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON

2 (McKinney's 1992 &

Supp. 2001). EC 2-1 further provides in pertinent part: "[LImportant
functions of the legal profession are to educate people to recognize their
problems, to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to
assist in making legal services fully available."
7 See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-7 (McKinney's 1992 &

Supp. 2001).

See also Joseph A. McManus, Malpractice Dangers in Tort

Case Referrals. 60 N.Y.St. B.J. 14, 16 (April, 1988).
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requires the services of a foreign attorney to commence suit in

another state 8 or in a foreign country 9 or in a specialized field
such as bankruptcy?' 0 Does the referring attorney have a duty to
investigate the credentials and professionalism of the out-of-state
attorney or specialist? And how can, a New York general
practitioner,
for
example,
diligently
investigate
the
professionalism, integrity and competence of, say, a California

lawyer, or a patent specialist? Is this obligation satisfied, as one
court has suggested, by simply verifying that the receiving
attorney is licensed in good standing in the relevant jurisdiction?"
Or is some more thorough type of search required? And does the

referring attorney's obligation to the client depend on whether she
has an ongoing relationship with the client, or whether the
allegedly negligent referral or monitoring was their first
interaction?
A related issue is what obligations are assumed by an

attorney who agrees to monitor the work of another attorney on
an ongoing basis.' 2 Moreover, does the referring attorney's civil
8 See e.g., Wildermann v. Wachtell, 149 Misc. 623, 267 N.Y.S. 840 (S. Ct.
New York Co. 1933), aff'd, 241 A.D. 812, 271 N.Y.S. 954 (1st Dep't 1934)
(New York attorney who retained a Pennsylvania attorney, approved by his
client, to conduct all of the procedural matters, cannot be held liable for the
negligence of the Pennsylvania attorney); Tormo v. Yormark, 398 F. Supp.
1159 (D.N.J. 1975) (New York attorney referring personal injury suit to New
Jersey counsel who was criminally indicted and subsequently embezzled the
clients' funds).
9See e.g., Robert E. Lutz, Ethics and InternationalPractice:A Guide to the
ProfessionalResponsibilities of Practitioners, 16 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 53, 69
(1992).
10 See, e.g., Williams v. Pretsch & Mainetti, 116 A.D.2d 861, 498 N.Y.S.2d
1006 (3d Dep't 1986) (Attorney referring client to a bankruptcy attorney was
held not responsible for malpractice committed by the bankruptcy attorney);
Glantz v. Rosenberg, 220 A.D.2d 719, 633 N.Y.S.2d 77 (2d Dep't 1995)
(Attorney hired as a consultant in a bankruptcy proceeding was held not liable
for the legal malpractice committed by the initial attorney).
" See e.g. Tormo, 398 F.Supp at 1171.
12 See Tormo, 398 F. Supp. at 1159; Hashemi v. Shack, 609 F. Supp
391, 395
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (attorney who agrees to "monitor" out-of-state litigation does
not give rise to attorney-client relationship such that he can be held liable for
malpractice under New York law).
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liability depend on whether he agreed to share a fee in connection
with the work by receiving counsel on the case? If so, what is
the implication of Disciplinary Rule 2-107 of the Code, which
explicitly limits the circumstances under which a lawyer may
divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a
partner in or associate of the referring attorney's firm?
In an effort to furnish some guidance for practitioners who
may be wary of their own professional liability, this article will
address the foregoing questions. It will consider the elements of
legal malpractice and the scope of the attorney-client relationship
in a variety of contexts. Next considered is whether liability
attaches to the mere recommendation of one attorney by another
and to what extent a duty to investigate the professionalism of that
attorney is implied in the act of referral. Separately considered
will be the duties inherent in an agreement to monitor the work of
the receiving attorney, and the implications of an agreement
between the attorneys to share their fees for the work.
As will be explained, the general rule is that a referring
attorney is not the guarantor of the work of receiving counsel,
and therefore not liable for the latter's malpractice, provided that
"due care.," 13
the referral was made in the exercise of
Generally, the law has not recognized a cause of action for legal
malpractice arising from an agreement to share fees with
Although there have been some recent
receiving counsel.
suggestions that such a cause of action might be derived from the
Code of Professional Responsibility, it will be argued that these
authorities erroneously conflate the ethical standards imposed by
14
the Code and the Model Rules with principles of civil liability.
Code expressly
Moreover, the Preliminary Statement to the
eschews its use as a basis for civil liability.' 5 It will be argued
13Wildermann at

624-25, 267 N.Y.S. 2d at 842.

Compare, Norris v. Silver, 701 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(interpreting Florida ethics code); with NYCLA Ethics Opinion 715, 1996 WL
592658 (May 28, 1996) (interpreting CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
DR 2-107, codified as 22 N.Y.C.R.R § 1200.12 (McKinney's 1992 & Supp.
2001); See infra Section IV.
14

15

CODE

OF

PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY,

Preliminary

Statement

(McKinney's 1992 & Supp. 2001) ("The code makes no attempt to prescribe
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that erosion of the "due care" standard would, in effect, make
referring counsel the guarantor of the work of receiving counsel,
which would further contradict a long line of authorities holding
that a violation of the Code may not be used as a basis for
imposing civil liability on an attorney. 16
II. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

The tort of legal malpractice in New York consists of the
failure of an attorney to exercise ordinary levels of competence,
directly causing injury to the attorney's client. 17 As the Appellate
Division has explained: "In order to establish a primafacie case
of legal malpractice, a client must demonstrate that his attorney
failed to exercise that degree of skill commonly exercised by an
ordinary member of the legal community, and that he incurred
damages as a direct result of his attorney's actions." " Thus, a
showing of legal malpractice requires proof of the existence of an
attorney-client relationship, negligence by the attorney resulting
in a departure from the standard of practice in the jurisdiction,
and proof that actual damages were proximately caused by the
departure. 19 In the context of malpractice occurring in litigation,
the element of causation has been construed to require a showing
"not only that the attorney was negligent, but also that 'but for'
either disciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule,
nor does it undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for
professional conduct.").
16 See, e.g., Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 779-80, 413
N.Y.S.2d
910, 911 (1978) ("Whatever may be the contraints imposed by the Code of
Professional Responsibility with the associated sanctions of professional
discipline when baseless legal proceedings are instituted by a lawyer on behalf
of a client, the courts have not recognized any liability of the lawyer to third
parties therefore where the factual situations have not fallen within one of the
acknowledged categories of tort or contract liability."); See infra section IV.
" 76 N.Y.Jur.2d § 35 at 47 (1989) (explaining New York's general
adherence to the rule that an attorney is not liable to a person other than his
client for the negligent performance of legal work).
18 Marshall v. Nacht, 172 A.D.2d 727, 569 N.Y.S.2d 113 (2d Dep't 1991).
'9Marshall, 172 A.D.2d at 727, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 114; See also Jordan v.
Lipsig, Sullivan, Mollen & Liapakis, 689 F. Supp. 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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the attorney's negligence
the plaintiff would have prevailed in the
2
underlying action. 0
The existence of an attorney-client relationship is a
necessary precondition to establishing liability for legal
malpractice. 21 Although there may be other bases for liability
against an attorney, 22 only an actual client of the attorney may
maintain an action for legal malpractice against that attorney.*3
However, practitioners looking for a bright-line definition of
what constitutes the attorney-client relationship are likely to be
disappointed. While the execution of a formal retainer agreement
has been deemed sufficient to commence the relationship, the
mere payment of an attorney's fee, in and of itself, does not give
24
rise to the existence of an attorney-client relationship. In New
York, the existence of an attorney-client relationship "does not
25
depend on an express agreement or upon payment of a fee,"
and, indeed, the act of paying an attorney's fee, without more, is
not sufficient to give rise to the attorney-client relationship.26
However, the absence of any payment, while not determinative,
"can be an indication that an attorney-client relationship never
existed." 27
Some decisions, outside the area of legal malpractice,
furnish guidance from which the rough outlines of an attorneyclient relationship may be hewn in the malpractice arena. For
example, in Priest v. Hennessy,2 8 the Court of Appeals
considered the enforceability of a grand jury subpoena seeking
production of the bills of attorneys representing the target of a
Pacesetter Communications Corp. v. Solin & Breindel, 150 A.D.2d 232,
541 N.Y.S.2d 404, 405 (1st Dep't 1989) (citation omitted).
21 See Volpe v. Canfield, 237 A.D.2d 282, 283, 654 N.Y.S.2d 160, 162 (2d
20

Dep't 1997).
22 See e.g., Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1994).
23 See 76 N.Y. Jur.2d § 36 at 47 (1989); Jordan, 689 F. Supp at 194.
24 See Jane Street Co. v. Rosenberg & Etis, P.C., 192 A.D.2d 451, 597
N.Y.S.2d
17, 18 (1st Dep't. 1993).
25
Id.

Brandman v. Cross & Brown Co., 126 Misc. 2d 185, 187, 479 N.Y.S.2d
435,
437 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1984).
27
Kubin v. Miller, 801 F. Supp. 1101, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
2851 N.Y.2d 62, 431 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1980).
26
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criminal investigation.29 In considering whether the subpoenaed
bills were exempt from production pursuant to the attorney-client
privilege, the court concluded that since fees were paid by a third
party, no privilege attached. 30 Accordingly, the court rejected
the assertion of privilege and upheld the subpoena.31
If the payment of fees does not suffice to give rise to an
attorney-client relationship, then what does? In the context of
the attorney-client privilege it has been held that it is "the act of
directly rendering legal advice, services or assistance ... that
forms the touchstone of the attorney-client relation." 32 In one
leading formulation, the Appellate Division observed, "The
relationship is not established because one pays a legal fee, or lost
because the client does not pay a fee, and neither the fact that the
parties have had an attorney-client relationship in the past nor that
they may have such a relationship in the future is determinative.
Whether the relationship exists or not is33 determined by the
client's purpose in contacting the attorney."
The courts have also used a "meeting of the minds"
definition:
A plaintiffs unilateral belief does not confer upon
him the status of client. Rather, to establish an
29

at 67, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 512.
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503(a) (1992). This section states in pertinent part that
'any person who obtains without the knowledge of the client evidence of a
confidential communication made between the attorney or his employee and
the client in the course of professional employment, shall not disclose, or be
allowed to disclose such communication, or shall the client be compelled to
disclose such communication, in any action, disciplinary trial or hearing, or
administrative action. . . ." See also Priest, 51 N.Y.2d at 69-70, 431
N.Y.S.2d at 515 (attorney-client relationship does not arise due to payment of
another attorney's fee).
3"Priest, 51 N.Y.2d at 71, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 515-16. The court stated that
fee arrangements between attorney and client do not ordinarily constitute a
Id.

30

confidential communication and re not usually privileged because the
privilege was not intended to protect such types of communication. Id. at 6970;32 431 N.Y.S.2d at 515.

Brandman, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 437 (citations omitted).

a3People v. O'Connor, 85 A.D.2d 92, 95, 447 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (4th

Dep't 1982).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2001

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 [2001], Art. 9

646

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 17

attorney-client relationship there must be an
explicit undertaking to perform a specific task.34
Such a fact-specific definition is neither a model of clarity nor a
template which furnishes much guidance.
The outer boundaries of the attorney-client relationship
35
were probed in Jordan v. Lipsig, Sullivan, Mollen & Liapakis,
where the court considered the question of whether a client's
husband could bring suit for legal malpractice against an attorney
who had bungled the personal injury action of the plaintiff's wife,
thereby extinguishing his derivative claim for loss of consortium.
Although Mrs. Jordan had consulted, signed a retainer agreement
with, met with and given various medical authorization forms to
the defendant attorneys, her husband did not. As a result, the
court concluded that he was not their client:
The facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that no
attorney-client relationship existed between Mr.
Jordan and defendants. He had no contact with the
firm, never met or spoke with any of the firm's
attorneys, never contacted the firm in any way and
had no intention for the firm to represent him in
any way. 36
Since the plaintiff was not a client of the defendant
attorneys, he would ordinarily have been barred from suing the
defendant attorneys due to lack of privity. 37 As the Jordan court
observed, "In New York, courts have often repeated the rule
that, absent proof of fraud, collusion, malicious acts or other
special circumstances, a plaintiff may not sue an attorney for
simple negligence absent privity of contract." 38 However, on
the facts of the Jordan case, the district court determined that an
Volpe, 237 A.D.2d at 283, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 162 (citations omitted).
689 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
36
1d. at 195.
14

35

37 Id.

38

Id. (citing e.g., Nakovics v. Klat, 128 A.D.2d 505, 506, 512 N.Y.S.2d

436, 438 (2d Dep't 1987)).
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exception should nonetheless be carved out permitting the
plaintiff to bring a claim for legal malpractice due to the unique
nature of his derivative claims against his wife's attorneys. 39 The
court reasoned that since the husband did not have standing to
bring a derivative claim by himself without his wife's underlying
claim, it would be unfair to deny him the opportunity to bring suit
for malpractice, even absent a true attorney-client relationship.4 °
Kubin v. Millera' considered whether an attorney-client
relationship between a partnership and its attorney also extended
to the individual partners as well. Kubin involved a federal
diversity action decided under New York law for breach of a
partnership agreement.42 The plaintiff sought to disqualify
counsel for the defendant partnership pursuant to DR 5-105 and
5-102 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, claiming that
the lawyer had previously represented him in matters substantially
related to the present action.43 The court denied the plaintiffs
motion to disqualify defense counsel, finding that the attorneys
had represented the partnership, and not him individually. a
Further, the court reasoned that there was "no written contract"
of employment or "any suggestion [the partnership's counsel] and
Kubin had an informal relationship in which [the partnership's
counsel] performed legal services gratuitously. 45 Thus, although
denying the motion to disqualify counsel, the court suggested that
an attorney-client relationship could be created by the "informal"
performance of gratuitous legal services.46
The Third Department, in C.K. Industries Corp. v. C.M.
Industries Corp., a7 considered the claim that an attorney who
drafted an agreement between two shareholders thereby
represented both of them and was liable in malpractice to each.
39Jordan,
40

41

689 F. Supp. at 197.
Id. at 195.

801 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).

42 id.
43
1Id.at

1113-1114.

44Id. at 1115.
45 id.
46 id.

47213

A.D.2d 846, 623 N.Y.S.2d 410 (3d Dept. 1995).
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This claim was rejected because the plaintiff shareholder never
consulted with the defendant attorney, whose fees were paid by
the partnership and not by the plaintiff. 48 Thus, as was the case
in Kubin, the provision of services to the partnership did not
thereby give rise to an attorney-client relationship
between the
49
defendant attorney and each individual partner.
In Hashemi v. Shack,50 a federal district judge, applying
New York law, held that a lawyer who agreed, in writing, to
"monitor" the progress of several lawsuits in another
jurisdiction, and to attempt to obtain counsel for the plaintiff, did
not thereby become the plaintiffs attorney. 51 The defendant
attorneys in Hashemi promised to continue monitoring the
plaintiff's suits on his behalf "until the question of representation
[was] resolved. '' 52 True to their word, the defendant attorneys
subsequently wrote to the plaintiff informing him that a default
judgment had been entered against him in the out-of-state case.
The plaintiff then sued the defendants for malpractice alleging
that they permitted the default to occur. 53 In dismissing the
claims for legal malpractice, the court reasoned that the
agreement to monitor the cases was not tantamount to an
agreement "to take any action with respect to them," and that the
defendant attorney "therefore reasonably assumed that he had no
54
duty to act.",
A different result was reached in Tormo v. Yormark,55 a
federal case applying New Jersey -law. Tormo held that a New
York lawyer who referred a personal injury case to a New Jersey
attorney had assumed a duty to supervise the progress of the case
in New Jersey. 56 Unlike the successful defendant in Hashemi,
48

Id. at 848, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
213 A.D.2d at 848, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 412. See also Kubin, 801 F. Supp.
at 1115.
50609 F. Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"52 Id. at 395
49

/d.

51Id. at 396.
54

Id. at 395-396.

55
56 398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975).

Id. at 1174.
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the defendant attorney in Tormo did not make any written
promises to monitor the progress of the out-of-state case, and
apparently did not request or receive any payment for his work.
The plaintiff claimed that the New York attorney had "repeatedly
57
assured [the plaintiff] that the matter Was proceeding well.",
Accordingly, an attorney-client relationship was deemed to exist
under New Jersey law and the defendant's motion for summary
judgment was denied.58
The New York Court of Appeals cast a wide net in
defining the attorney-client relationship in Leon v. Martinez.59
That decision sustained the sufficiency of a complaint for legal
malpractice against an attorney who had represented several
parties in an underlying personal injury action.6 ° The defendant
attorney initially represented Martinez in a personal injury
action. 6 1 At his request, the attorney drafted an agreement in
which Martinez assigned a percentage of his recovery from the
personal injury action to Leon, the plaintiff in the action for legal
malpractice. 62 When the defendant attorney disbursed the entire
net proceeds of the personal injury settlement to Martinez, Leon
sued for breach of contract and, significantly, malpractice. Leon
argued that the defendant attorney "was requested by both
Martinez and plaintiffs to prepare the [assignment] instrument,"
that the attorney had advised the plaintiffs to get a written
assignment from Martinez, and that he had discussed the matter
with both assignor and assignee. 63 Thus, the Court reasoned, the
defendant attorney's payment of the entire settlement proceeds to
one of his clients breached his duty to his other, assignee,
client. 64
The aforementioned cases establish a framework for
analyzing the existence of an attorney-client relationship. As we
at
5"TId.
1d. at

1173.
1174-75.

'9
60 84 N.Y.2d at 83, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
Id.at 90, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
61

id.

62
1d.
63

at 86, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 973.
1d. at 90, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
64 id.
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have seen, this has generally been a fact-specific analysis often
65
taking into consideration the existence of a retainer agreement,
the payment of an attorney's fee,66 the precise scope of any
agreement between the attorney and the prospective client, 67 and
any explicit representations which the attorney made to the
prospective client. 68 The paying of a fee 69 and even the
monitoring of litigation, 70 do not, in and of themselves, establish
the existence of an attorney-client relationship in New York. The
First and Second Departments of the Appellate Division disagree
"express agreement" is necessary to create such
as to whether an
71
relationship.
a
We will next turn to specific examples of claims arising
from referrals. These will be divided into two categories: 1)
negligent referrals, i.e., referrals to allegedly incompetent
attorneys that were negligent ab initio; and 2) liability based upon
the negligent failure to monitor or supervise receiving counsel.
III.

Is THERE MALPRACTICE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENT
REFERRAL?

In general, a lawyer is not responsible' for the acts or
omissions of a lawyer outside the firm who serves as co-counsel
or in a similar arrangement. 72 One commentator has suggested
that a lawyer who refers a case to a foreign counsel "may be
liable in negligence or for a breach of a professional obligation
unless the lawyer takes at least minimal steps to assure the
65 See
66

Id. at 86-7, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 973.

See Kubin, 801 F. Supp. at 1120.

67
68

See Hashemi, 609 F. Supp. at 395.
Compare Tormo, 398 F. Supp. at 1173, with Hashemi, 609 F. Supp at

394.
69
See Jane Street Co., 192 A.D.2d at 451, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 18.
70 See Hashemi, 609 F. Supp. at 394.

"' Compare Jane Street Co., 192 A.D.2d at 451, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 17, with
Volpe, 237 A.D.2d at 283, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 162.
72 583 Practicing Law Institute, Litigation and Administrative Practice Course

Handbook Series, Lit. 299 (April 1998) at page 306. But see, Mallen, Legal
Malpractice § 5.9 at 390 (4' Ed. 1996).
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competence of the referred counsel. "73 A New York court has
suggested, without an extended discussion on this issue, that a
referring attorney is held to "the exercise of due care in
recommending a foreign attorney." 74
This issue has not yet been resolved in New York as there
are few decisions explicitly analyzing the responsibility of
referring counsel to investigate the credentials and competence of
receiving counsel. For example, in the case of Cohen v. Lipsig,75
the plaintiff had retained the late Harry Lipsig to prosecute a
personal injury case on her behalf. The plaintiff alleged that after
Lipsig had represented her as attorney of record for twelve years,
he transferred the file to outside trial counsel without first
obtaining her informed consent.76 Trial counsel proceeded to
commit various acts of negligence as well as compounding the
neglect of Lipsig, resulting in a settlement unfavorable to the
plaintiff. 77 In reversing an order granting summary judgment in
favor of Lipsig, the Appellate Division ruled that there were
numerous disputed issues of fact that the plaintiff was entitled to
present to the jury concerning the negligence of both Lipsig and
outside trial counsel, including, "whether [Lipsig] used
reasonable care in his choice of such trial counsel . . ."78 Both
Lipsig and trial counsel were responsible for their failure where,
over the course of twelve years, they neglected to obtain medical
records to establish the plaintiff's claim.
In Cohen, the relationship between referring counsel and
the client was obviously much stronger than the relationship
73 Lutz, Ethics and International Practice: A Guide to the Professional
Responsibilities of Practitioners, 16 Fordham Int'l L.J. 53, 69 (1992). Lutz

bases his comment upon a single footnote in Clemminghasw Co. v. City of
Norwich, 93 F.R.D. 338 (D. Conn. 1981), recognizing a "duty to supervise
co-counsel." This is, as will be pointed out below, a different duty from the
duty to investigate the background of receiving counsel. See also, Mallen,
supra
74 at §5.9.
Wildermann, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
15 92 A.D.2d 536,459 N.Y.S.2d 98 (2d Dep't 1983).
76
1d. at 536, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
77 id.

78

id.
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between the client and trial counsel . 79 This was not a casual
referral to a law school roommate or professional acquaintance
over the course of a social encounter. Rather, the attorney-client
relationship between Lipsig and Cohen was indisputable and of
Dickensian duration, and Lipsig was designated attorney of
record.80 It seems appropriate that a lawyer to whom a client has
entrusted a matter for twelve years cannot escape liability for his
own professional misconduct by referring the case out to another
lawyer in the same of field of specialization, here, personal injury
litigation, at the eleventh hour.
Consider the situation, unlike that presented in Cohen v.
Lipsig, in which referring counsel does not become attorney of
record, but rather refers a personal injury case to an out-of-state
practitioner.
What duty does referring counsel have to
investigate the competence, professionalism and integrity of
receiving counsel?
Although no New York decision has discussed this point
in detail, it was addressed by a federal district court applying
New Jersey law in Tormo v. Yormark. 81 The facts of Tormo are a
referring attorney's nightmare: A New York attorney, Devlin,
was consulted by a client whose daughter had recently been
injured in a boating accident in New Jersey.82 Unlicensed in that
jurisdiction, Devlin agreed to "see what could be done with
regard to settlement."
Shortly thereafter, Yormark, a New
Jersey attorney, telephoned and met with Devlin at his office. 83
Devlin, to his abiding regret, informed the plaintiff that Yormack
was a "good, well-qualified lawyer," unaware that, at the time
Yormark was under indictment in Essex County, New Jersey for
insurance fraud.84 The indictment was reported in the New
Jersey newspapers, but Devlin was unaware of that. Devlin's
only independent inquiry into Yormark's reputation was
consulting a lawyer's directory confirming that he was a licensed
79 Id.
80/d.

8'398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975).
82 Id.at
1165.
83 Id.
84
Id. at 1166.
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New Jersey attorney.85 Yormark was later convicted of insurance
fraud, and, following the settlement of plaintiff's claims for
$150,000, he embezzled the settlement monies, prompting a
malpractice action against him as well as Devlin.86
When Devlin moved for summary judgment, the district
court held that, under New Jersey law, referring counsel "was
under a duty to exercise care in retaining Yormark to ensure that
he was competent and trustworthy." 87 This duty arose both from
referring counsel's express representations as to Yormark's
qualifications, as well as from his affirmative conduct and the act
of referral. 88 Devlin's motion for summary judgment was thus
denied, and the court ruled that there were sufficient disputed fact
issues to merit a jury trial.89
On the other hand, the court ruled that Devlin could not
be held liable for his failure to learn of, or inquire into, the
criminal indictment against receiving counsel. The indictment
was not a matter of public record in New York and referring
counsel has no duty to check with the ethics committee and
prosecutor's office in every county in which receiving counsel
practices. 90 Rather, referring counsel's duty was discharged by
verifying that receiving counsel was licensed to practice law in
New Jersey. 9' However, the court went on to reason that Devlin
could be held liable because the manner in which receiving
counsel contacted him should have placed him on notice that he
may have solicited the case from the plaintiff. 92 The evidence of
potential solicitation, in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, should have triggered further inquiry into the
851d.

86 1d.

at 1167.

at 1168.
87 398 F. Supp. at 1170.
88 Id.
89 1d.

at 1171.

90Id.

at 1170.

91M."

92 1d.

at 1166. Referring counsel Devlin initially learned of receiving counsel.
Yormark through telephone calls Yormark placed to him representing that he
was "familiar with the accident." Yormark requested and Devlin agreed to a
personal meeting.
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ethics of receiving counsel. 93 Accordingly, Devlin's motion for
summary judgment was denied.94

Tormo is subject to criticism on a variety of grounds.5
Although the opinion explicitly eschewed a duty to investigate the
background of receiving counsel, it is difficult to believe that
Yormark's indictment and conviction did not play a significant
part in the court's decision. 96 The argument that "the duty arose
from Devlin's express representations as to Yormark's
qualifications, ' ' 7 is unpersuasive. Doesn't every referral almost
by definition contain at least an implicit recommendation of the
attorney's skill and professionalism? It is questionable whether
the defendant's recommendation in Tormo had an obvious causal
connection with the actual legal malpractice. Devlin's express
representation to the plaintiff was not that receiving counsel was
honest or trustworthy, but that he was a "good, well-qualified
lawyer." 98 But the deficiency of receiving counsel in Tormo was
not that he lacked the technical qualifications to practice law in
New Jersey, but, rather, that he was a thief. 99 Indeed, the district
court determined that referring counsel had no duty to investigate
the credentials of receiving counsel beyond confirming that he
was in fact licensed to practice law in New Jersey.1 00 Thus, the
Tormo court, while leaving open the possibility of a cause of
action based upon an express representation, failed to take the
next logical step by requiring a causal nexus between the alleged
misrepresentation and the actual malpractice. 101
93 Id. at 1166.
See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-103,
codified as 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.8 (McKinney's 1992 & Supp. 2001). See
also In re Introcaso, 26 N.J. 353 (1958) (suspending an attorney from
practicing
law for employing a runner to solicit clients).
94

1d. at 1171.

95Id.
96

at 1159.

id.

Id. at 1170.
98 Id. at 1166.
97

99 While the concept of a "good lawyer" can be said to imply notions of

integrity and professionalism, Devlin's representation at issue in Tormo
appears to be of a general nature.

'ooTormo, 398 F. Supp. at 1171.
'0oId. at 1770.
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In sum, the duty to investigate the credentials of receiving
counsel, particularly in a foreign jurisdiction, is minimal.
Referring counsel is not chargeable with knowledge of non-public
information about receiving counsel, but must be alert to evidence
of unprofessional conduct by receiving counsel. 10 2 The next
question which arises is, assuming that referring counsel has no
reason to suspect the incompetence of receiving counsel, what
responsibility does she assume for monitoring the latter's work?

IV.

Is THERE A DUTY To MONITOR OUTSIDE COUNSEL?

A line of cases in New York has considered the liability of
a lawyer who refers a litigation matter to an attorney in another
state or in a specialized area of law. As will be seen, several
authorities have declined to impose a duty on referring counsel to
monitor or supervise the work of a specialist or out-of-state
attorney.
The early case of Wildermann v. Wachtell, 10 3 directed a
verdict in favor of a New York lawyer who had referred a
collection matter to a Pennsylvania attorney who negligently
failed to file a lis pendens, resulting in an inability to collect on
the client's claim. 104
The plaintiff signed a formal retainer
agreement with New York counsel, who recommended a
Pennsylvania attorney, and the two lawyers agreed to share
equally in the recovery on a contingency fee basis.105 The
Pennsylvania attorney negligently failed to file the lis pendens,
resulting in a loss of recovery to the plaintiff and prompting an
06
action for legal malpractice. 1
The court noted that there was no claim that the New
York attorney was negligent in his selection of particular counsel
in Pennsylvania and that, in any event, the standard was that of
ordinary care: "A lawyer should not be held to a stricter rule in
l0 2 See Tormo, 398 F. Supp. at 1171.
149 Misc. 623, 624-25, 267 N.Y.S. 840, 842 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933),
aff'd, 241 A.D. 812, 271 N.Y.S. 954 (1st Dep't 1934).
10'

104 Id.
5
'°

Id. at 624, 267 N.Y.S. at 841-42.
'06Id. at 623, 267 N.Y.S. at 841.
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foreign matters than the exercise of due care in recommending a
foreign attorney." 107 Since the selection of Pennsylvania counsel
was not negligent, the question remained whether the New York
attorney would be held vicariously responsible for the negligence
of the former:
The novel question arises, therefore, as yet
undetermined in this state, whether a lawyer here,
who retains with due care an attorney in a foreign
jurisdiction to take care of procedural matters in
the foreign state, becomes ipso facto liable for any
negligence of the foreign attorney, even though the
client has been informed of the necessity and
reason for the retainer and
has approved the course
08
1
attorney.
of
choice
and
The court answered this question in the negative,
reasoning that to hold referring counsel liable "would subject him
to hazards which he is not qualified either to anticipate or to
prevent." 109 Thus, although New York counsel had been
formally retained, and, indeed, expected to share in the fruits of
the labors of out-of-state counsel, the court declined to apply a
duty to supervise because it "would impose an impossible burden
upon practicing attorneys." 110

Interestingly, Wildermann presents the converse of
Hashemi v. Shack"' in its analysis of the attorney-client
relationship. The district court in Hashemi dismissed an action
for legal malpractice against a Washington D.C. law firm,
holding that an explicit agreement to "monitor" pending litigation
in another jurisdiction was not sufficient to trigger the
commencement of an attorney-client relationship. 112
The
Wildermann court held that the existence of an attorney-client
Id. at 624-25, 267 N.Y.S. at 842.
'ld. at 624, 267 N.Y.S. at 841.

07

'

09

d. at 625, 267 N.Y.S. at 842.

'10Id.
"' Compare Wildermann at 624-25, 267 N.Y.S. at 841-42 with Hashemi,

609 F. Supp. at 395-97 (see discussion in Section II, supra).
112609 F. Supp. at 397, discussed supra at notes 50-54.
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relationship did not impose upon counsel
an obligation to monitor
3
the progress of out-of-state litigation."
The principles enunciated in Wildermann were applied in
the leading case of Broadway Maintenance Corp. v. Tunstead &
Schechter,114 which held that a New York attorney who referred a
lawsuit to Virginia counsel could not be held liable for the latter's
negligence where there was no evidence that New York counsel
assumed a supervisory responsibility over the out-of-state
action. 1 5 The New York attorneys in Broadway Maintenance
had a longstanding relationship with the plaintiff as general
counsel, yet never represented the client in construction contract
claims. l l 6 As a result, New York counsel referred the case to
Virginia counsel, whose appointment was approved by a
bankruptcy judge after the plaintiff began operating as a debtor in
possession under a bankruptcy reorganization. 1 7 In a subsequent
action for legal malpractice, New York counsel was held to have
no liability for the work of the Virginia attorneys because it did
not undertake "supervisory responsibility" with regard to the outof-state action. 18 The New York firm continued to function as
"general counsel" for the client, occasionally acting as a liaison
between the client and Virginia counsel in obtaining
documentation to support the client's claim. 1 9 The firm's
conduct, however, amounted to "incidental services" that were
"entirely appropriate to its role as general counsel, which in no
way implied or could reasonably be found to have implied, that it
was undertaking to supervise the work of the two retained law
firms in pursuing the plaintiff's claim for damages in
Virginia." 120 Thus, recommending out-of-state counsel and acting
as a conduit for a memorandum between the client and out-of"' Wildermann at 624-25, 267 N.Y.S. at 842.

A.D.2d 587, 487 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1st Dep't 1985).

114

110

"l

Id. at 588, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 800-01.

"

6

Id. at 588, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 806.

1171id.

"' Id. at 589, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 801.
119 Id.

120oid.
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state counsel was insufficient to impose liability
on referring
121
counsel.
receiving
of
negligence
the
counsel for
A similar result was obtained in CVC Capital Corp. v.
Weil, Gotshal and Manges, 122 which ruled that a New York law
firm could not be held responsible for the negligence of a Puerto
Rico law firm on a failure to supervise theory. 123 The plaintiff in
CVC Capital sought to impose liability upon its New York
attorneys for bankruptcy work performed in Puerto Rico by local
counsel. 124 Although the Appellate Division found that there was
no obligation to supervise the activities of out-of-state counsel, it
further opined that:
Even if sufficient evidence existed to
demonstrate defendants owed a duty to supervise
the Puerto Rico-based counsel, no independent
duty existed to independently verify factual reports
made by those attorneys concerning the timeliness
of pleadings filed, their court appearances, and
representations made concerning the actions of a
bankruptcy trustee in 1986.125
Thus, there was no obligation to look behind the factual
representations of foreign counsel. 126 While acknowledging in the
abstract that a duty to supervise out-of-state counsel may arise
upon a proper factual showing, the Appellate Division in
Broadway Maintenance Corp. and CVC Capital held that a duty
to supervise foreign counsel did not arise merely from the
retention or receipt of memoranda and correspondence from such
counsel, nor from serving as a liaison to the client. 127

121 Id.

Although the defendant law firm in Broadway Maintenance Corp. had

recommended the out-of-state counsel, there was no claim in that case of
negligence in the selection of out-of-state counsel.
122 192 A.D.2d 324, 595 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1st Dep't 1993).
23
'
id. at 325, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
24Id. at 324, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
12
5Id. (citation omitted).

126 d.
127

See Broadway Maintenance Corp., 110 A.D.2d at 587, 487 N.Y.S.2d at

800; CVC Capital,192 A.D.2d at 325, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
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This line of reasoning was extended to encompass referral
to a specialist in Williams v. Pretsch & Mainetti,128 which upheld
the dismissal of a malpractice complaint against a New York
attorney based upon the misconduct and malpractice of
bankruptcy counsel to whom he had entrusted a judgment for
enforcement. 129 The defendant in Williams was a litigator who
obtained a judgment for his client against an individual who
eventually filed for bankruptcy. 130 When bankruptcy counsel
recommended by the defendant attorney committed malpractice in
bankruptcy court in his efforts to collect on the judgment, the
client sued referring counsel for malpractice. 3 1 However, the
Appellate Division held that its prior decision in Broadway
Maintenance Corp. precluded the liability of referring counsel for
32
the negligence of receiving counsel.'
Thus, the supervisory duties of referring counsel, as can
be seen from the foregoing decisions in this section, have been
largely defined in the negative. We now know to some extent
what conduct by referring counsel will not constitute supervision
over receiving counsel for the purpose of professional liability.
For example, merely receiving, forwarding or monitoring
correspondence from out-of-state counsel does not, without more,
give rise to professional liability any more than does the mere act
133
of referral, consistent with the exercise of due diligence.
Moreover, an explicit agreement to monitor the status of an outof-state lawsuit does not obligate an attorney to prevent a default
in that case. 134 As discussed above, Cohen v. Lipsig held that the
attorney of record in a personal injury action cannot insulate
121

116 A.D.2d 861, 498 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (3d Dep't 1986).

129 Id.
30

Id. (Defendant referred plaintiff to Krom, another attorney to pursue the
action in bankruptcy court, the forum in which the alleged malpractice actually
took place. The defendant was held by Special Term not to be responsible for
the3 subsequent malpractice of Krom).
1

1 1 1d.
32
1 1d.
133

See Broadway Maintenance Corp., I10 A.D.2d at 587, 487 N.Y.S.2d at

800-01.
458.
134

See also CVC Capital Corp., 192 A.D.2d at 325, 595 N.Y.S.2d at

See Hashemi, 609 F.Supp at 395-96.
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himself from liability by referring the case out to a different
attorney for trial. 135 But New York courts have yet to provide
guidance as to what activities by referring counsel would be
sufficient to invoke a duty to supervise the work of receiving
counsel.
Although there is no recorded New York case making a
factual finding of negligent failure to supervise, the district
court's decision in Tormo v. Yormark 136 wrestled with this issue
based on the unique facts of the case and pursuant to New Jersey
law. As mentioned earlier,' 37 Tormo involved a New York
attorney who referred a personal injury matter to a New Jersey
lawyer who, unbeknownst to referring counsel, had been indicted
for insurance fraud, a crime of which he was convicted shortly
before he absconded with the proceeds of the client's settlement
check. 138 In addition to considering the duty of referring counsel
to inquire into the character and competence of receiving counsel,
the Tormo court addressed the adequacy of the plaintiffs
allegations that the New York attorney negligently failed to
supervise receiving counsel. 139 The court declined to consider
whether a New York attorney generally ought to be under a duty
to exercise any supervision over a New Jersey lawyer's conduct
in a New Jersey lawsuit.' 40 However, the court determined that
New York counsel could be held liable for his "express
representations to [the client] concerning the progress of the
case," along with his promise to investigate the nature of the
authorization which the New Jersey attorney forwarded to the
client. 14 1 In addition, the New York attorney in Tormo, after
advising the plaintiff that the case was "progressing," 142 allowed
a year to pass, during which time he made no effort to contact
New Jersey counsel or monitor the progress of the case. This
135 92 A.D.2d at 536, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 99.
136398

F. Supp. 1159, 1174.

13 7

See Section III, supra.
138398 F. Supp. at 1166.
39

Id.

at 1173.

140 id.
141 Id.

142

1Id.

at 1167.
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conduct, together with the other facts and circumstances of the
case, was sufficient to be considered by a jury in assessing the
43
negligent supervision claim. 1
Thus, New Jersey law permits the imposition of
professional liability on out-of-state attorneys who agree to
monitor the progress of a case they are not personally
145
handling. 144 Contrast this reasoning with Hashemi v. Shack,
which held, inter alia, that an out-of-state attorney's explicit
agreement to monitor the status of a New York lawsuit does not
give rise to the existence of an attorney-client relationship for the
purpose of imposing professional liability. 146 Indeed, the
definition of attorney-client relationship relied upon in Tormo is
147
considerably broader than that recognized in New York.
Further, the fact that the New York attorney in Tormo did not
execute a formal retainer agreement or receive any fees was
irrelevant: "The law of New Jersey imposes the duties incident
to such a relationship on one who merely assumes to give legal
advice and counsel." 148 Thus, the promise in Tormo to "see
what could be done with regard to settlement" was held to give
rise to an attorney-client relationship, 149 whereas the promise in
Hashemi to "continue monitoring the suits on your behalf' was
not. 150 As noted in Section II, supra, in New York, "to establish
an attorney-client relationship there must be an explicit
undertaking to perform a specific task."'15 Thus, the reasoning
of Tormo, while illustrative of the pitfalls of a blind referral to
foreign counsel, has not been adopted in New York.

14 3

1d. at 1173.

'44 Tormo,

398 F. Supp. at 1173.
1 609 F. Supp. at 391. See also Section II, supra.
46
1 1d. at 395.
147 Tormo, 398 F. Supp. at 1169.
141 Id. at 1169 (citation omitted).
149 Id.

150Hashemi,

609 F.Supp. at 395.
Volpe, 237 A.D.2d at 283, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 162 (citation omitted);
but see Jane Street Co., 597 N.Y.S.2d at 17. (attorney-client relationship is
not dependent on express agreement or payment of fee).
'15See
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While we have considered the liability vel non of referring
counsel for the negligence of specialists retained to assist the
client,152 one recent decision has addressed the converse situation
and considered the liability of bankruptcy specialists for the
negligence of the attorney of record who hired them as
consultants in a bankruptcy proceeding. The attorney of record
in Glantz v. Rosenberg 53 hired the defendant attorneys as
"consultants" in a bankruptcy matter because he "was unfamiliar
with bankruptcy law and procedure."1 54 When the attorney of
record ignored a summons and notice of trial in bankruptcy court,
the proceeding was dismissed, resulting in a malpractice claim. '55
The Appellate Division, in rejecting claims for contribution
against the bankruptcy consultants, observed that their role was
limited to drafting documents and advising the attorney of record
and therefore they had no duty to appear in court. 156 Since the
failure to appear in court on the specified date was solely the
responsibility of counsel of record, all claims against the
57
bankruptcy specialists were properly dismissed. 1
Glantz stands for the simple, common-sense proposition
that counsel of record cannot seek contribution from other
attorneys for his own failure to obey a notice to appear in court.
In addition, the decision bespeaks a desire to prune and restrict
the liability of other attorneys who might have conceivably been
in a position to prevent the malpractice, yet had no duty to do so.
Thus, the fact that a consultant is one link in a chain of attorneys
providing legal service to a client does not justify imposing
professional liability on all of the attorneys engaged in the overall
endeavor.

152

Compare Williams, 116 A.D.2d at 861, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 1006 (holding

that trial counsel was not responsible for malpractice of a bankruptcy
specialist); with Cohen, 92 'A.D.2d at 536, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 98 (counsel of
record responsible for misdeeds of outside trial counsel).
15'220 A.D.2d 719, 633 N.Y.S.2d 77 (2d Dep't 1995).
54
1 Id. at 720, 633 N.Y.S.2d
at 78.
15 5
id.
156

Id.

157id.
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V.

DOES AN AGREEMENT To DIVIDE FEES GIVE RISE TO
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY BY THE REFERRING ATTORNEY?

Does an agreement among attorneys to share legal fees
give rise to professional liability to both? In New York, the
payment of attorneys' fees does not, without more, give rise to an
attorney-client relationship. 158
As demonstrated in the
immediately preceding section, not every attorney who collects a
fee is responsible for the malpractice of every159
other attorney who
client.
same
the
for
matter
same
the
on
works
However, an additional level of analysis may be suggested
by the Code of Professional Responsibility, which imposes
conditions upon the division of fees between lawyers, and forbids
the sharing of fees with non-lawyers. 160 DR 2-107 (A) of the
Code provides in pertinent part as follows:
A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services
with another lawyer who is not a partner in or
associate of the lawyer's law firm or law office,
unless:
1.

The client consents to employment of the
other lawyer after a full disclosure that a
division of fees will be made.

2.

The division is in proportion to the services
performed by each lawyer or, by a writing
given to the client, each lawyer assumes
joint responsibilityfor the representation.

3.

The total fee of the lawyers does not exceed
reasonable compensation for all legal

158 See Brandman, 126 Misc.2d at 185, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 435. See also
Kubin, 801 F. Supp. at 115.
159 See, e.g., Williams, 116 A.D.2d at 861, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 1006.
'60 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-107 ("Division of Fees
Among Lawyers"), codified as 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 1200.12 (McKinney's 1992 &
Supp. 2001); DR 3-102(A) (prohibiting fee-sharing with a non-lawyer).
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services they rendered the client. 161
Thus, the Code contemplates either a sharing of work or162a
sharing of "responsibility" by all lawyers who share in the fee.
The Ethical Considerations, rather then explaining this phrase,
merely paraphrase it: "A fee may properly be divided between
lawyers properly associated if the division is in proportion to the
services performed by each lawyer or, by a writing given to the
client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the
representation and if the total fee is reasonable."' 63 The Code
does not explain in what manner the lawyers must "assume joint
responsibility" for the representation, or whether the language of
DR 2-107(A) (2) is intended to be used as a springboard for the
imposition of civil liability on a lawyer who agrees to share a fee
but does not perform work on a case. The plain language of DR
2-107 seems to suggest that a lawyer who accepts a fee yet does
no work should agree in writing to assume responsibility for the
representation.
But what if the attorney does not assume
responsibility? Is the remedy a grievance before the disciplinary
committee or a civil suit for legal malpractice? The Preliminary
Statement to the Code expressly eschews its use as a basis for
imposing civil liability: "The Code makes no attempt to prescribe
either disciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of a
Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standards for
civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct." 164 It is thus
necessary to look beyond the language of the Code itself to
understand its implications for attorney malpractice.
Fee-splitting agreements among attorneys have typically
prevailed at the personal injury bar. 165 Even prior to the adoption
161

Id. (emphasis added).

162

Id.

163

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

Supp. 2001).
164

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

165

See

EC 2-22 (McKinney's 1992 &

Preliminary Statement.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

EC 2-20 (McKinney's 1992

& Supp. 2001). See also Gore v. Kressner, 157 A.D.2d 575, 575 N.Y.S.2d

319 (1st Dept 1990) (upholding written agreement to divide recovery in
personal injury action).
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of the Code of Professional Responsibility in New York in
1970,166 the courts upheld the division of fees among attorneys
67
provided that there was a sharing of service or responsibility.'
The prohibition of a "finders' fee," payable regardless of the
service performed or responsibility assumed by a forwarding
lawyer, was designed, in part, "to keep the profession of law
from becoming an ordinary business." 168 Thus, the regulation of
fee-splitting among attorneys derived its origin from a desire to
elevate the legal profession to "a branch of the administration of
69
justice and not a mere money-getting trade." 1
The enforceability of an agreement to divide fees between
attorneys at common law was considered by the Appellate
Division in Jontow v. Jontow.170 At issue in Jontow was the
enforceability of a written retainer agreement pursuant to which
referring counsel and trial counsel were to share equally in any
attorneys' fees recovered in a negligence action.171 After the case
was on the trial calendar, the plaintiff discharged the referring
attorney.1 72 After a plaintiff's verdict, trial counsel persuaded the
trial judge to award attorneys' fees on a quantum meruit basis
pursuant to which fees were divided in proportion to the actual
work performed on the case. 173 As a result, virtually all of the
attorneys' fees were awarded to trial counsel, leaving referring
counsel essentially out in the cold. 174 The Appellate Division
'66Although the Code was adopted in New York in 1970, the current version
of DR 2-107 was adopted in 1990. See N.Y.C.L.A. Ethics Op. 715, 1996 WL

592658.
167 See Greenwald v. Zyvith, 23 A.D.2d 201, 259
N.Y.S.2d 387 (2d Dep't
1965).
1611d. at 203, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
169 Id. at 390 (quoting from the Canon 34 of the Canons of
Professional
Ethics).
170 34 A.D.2d 744, 310 N.Y.S.2d 145 (1st Dept 1970).
Although Jontow
was decided five months after enactment of the Code of Professional
Responsibility on January 1, 1970, the events recited in the opinion took place
prior to the enactment of the Code, which is not relied upon in the decision.
171310 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
72

1

id.

173 id.
74

1

id.
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reversed the trial court's order allocating fees in proportion
to the
175
actual work done, and upheld the written fee agreement
The New York courts have similarly refused, in cases
decided under the Code, to look behind the agreement and
question the quantity of services provided as long as some work
was performed by referring counsel. 176
For example, in
Benjamin v. Koeppel, 177 the Court of Appeals upheld a fee
sharing agreement between lawyers, observing that:
It has long been understood that in disputes
among attorneys over the enforcement of feesharing agreements, the courts will not inquire into
the precise worth of the services performed by the
parties as long as each party actually contributed to
the legal work and there is no claim that178 either
"refused to contribute more substantially."
The plaintiff attorney in Benjamin had sought to enforce a
referral agreement pursuant to which the defendant attorneys
agreed to pay him one third of any fees earned by them on a real
estate tax matter. 179 The referring attorney's work consisted of
"interviewing the client, evaluating the case, discussing the
matter with firm attorneys and attending a meeting between the
client and a firm partner." 180 Since the plaintiff performed work
on the case, and served as liaison with the client, "he was entitled
81
to his share of the fee as allocated in the parties' agreement." 1

175

Id. The court stated:

"In view of the fact that there was a written

agreement between the appellant and the respondent to divide their fee equally,
and the fact that the appellant did perform services for the plaintiff, it was
error for the trial court to set the fees in question on a quantum meruit basis."
176 Witt V. Cohen, 192 A.D.2d 528, 596 N.Y.S.2d 117 (2d
Dept 1993)
(upholding agreement to share attorneys' fees "so long as the attorney who
seeks his share of the fee has contributed some work, labor or service toward
the earning of the fee").
177 Benjamin v. Koeppel, 85 N.Y.2d 549, 556, 626 N.Y.S.2d 982, 986
(1995).
178Id.
179

85 N.Y.2d at 552, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 983.

180 Id.
181

Id. at 556, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
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Since the courts have been receptive to finding even
minimal amounts of work sufficient to constitute "services" to
the client, there has been little analysis of the alternate prong of
DR 2-107(A)(2), explaining what is meant by the assumption of
"joint responsibility for the representation." 182 The question
arises whether a retainer agreement by which two attorneys agree
to share in their fees can be construed to impose liability upon
referring counsel. The retainer agreement in Wildermann, a preCode case, contemplated that both attorneys would share equally
in the proceeds of the recovery of the Pennsylvania lawyer's
efforts. 183 As discussed earlier, this arrangement
did not result in
184
counsel.
referring
on
liability
of
imposition
the
As we have seen, the fact that an attorney may have
performed services for a client in a particular matter does not
necessarily render that attorney liable for negligence committed
by another attorney working on the same case. 185 Assuming that
referring counsel did not perform any services for the client, even
under the laissez-faire approach enunciated in Benjamin, should
the retainer agreement in and of itself be sufficient to impose civil
"responsibility" on referring counsel under DR 2-107? For a
variety of reasons, the answer is probably not. The phrase "joint
responsibility," although not defined in the Code, in all
likelihood refers to ethical or moral responsibility and not civil
liability. Moreover, the wording of DR 2-107 (A) (2) renders it
unethical to accept a fee when the lawyer does no work unless
she assumes joint responsibility "by a writing given the
client..." 18 6 Given the foregoing, it seems anomalous that the
absence of such a writing could provide a springboard for civil
liability. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the New York
courts have held that an attorney's violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility does not give rise to a civil cause of
182 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
'

DR 2-107.

267 N.Y.S. at 840.

at 625, 267 N.Y.S. at 842.
See, e.g., Williams, 116 A.D.2d at 861, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 1006, discussed
in Section III, supra.
186 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107.
144Id.

185
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As one commentator has
action against that attorney. 187
observed: "Generally, the fact of violation of the [disciplinary]
rules is not a predicate for a malpractice action." 188
The Court of Appeals' recent decision in Shapiro v.
McNeil1189 is instructive on this point. Here an attorney was
sued, not by a client, but by a third party who claimed that'the
attorney had improperly transferred out of his trust account funds
which had been deposited there by the client. 190 Unbeknownst to
the defendant attorney, the source of the deposits into his attorney
trust account were funds which his own client had bilked from the
plaintiff by fraud and misrepresentations. 191
The Court of Appeals held that the attorney, Bleecker,
acted reasonably in following his client's instructions for the
disposition of the funds which the client had deposited into
Bleecker's trust account.' 92 In addition, the court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the defendant attorney had a duty, under
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to advise him of the
receipt of the funds and to pay those funds pursuant to the
plaintiff's instructions. 193 Alternatively, the Court of Appeals
observed that even a violation of the Code "will not, in and of
itself, create a duty that gives rise to a cause of action that would
otherwise not exist at law." 194

187 Drago
188

v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778, 413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978).

Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Lawyers' Contracts is Different, 67

Fordham L. Rev. 443, 495 (1998) f.n.75.
189 92 N.Y.2d 91, 677 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1998).
90

'
Id.
191 Id.

9'2Id.

at 94, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 49.

at 99, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 51.
See also CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY, DR 9-102 (c),
'9' Id.
codified as 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.46 (McKinney's 1992 & Supp. 2001). The

provision involved in the Shapiro case requires an attorney to "promptly notify
a client or third person of the receipt of funds, securities, or other properties in

which the client or third person has an interest."

It further obligates the

attorney to follow the instructions of the client or third person in disposing of

the funds, securities or other properties.
194Shapiro, 92

N.Y.2d at 97, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 50 (citation omitted). Accord

Drago, 46 N.Y.2d at 779-780.
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Although a third party, under Shapiro, cannot derive a
cause of action against an attorney from a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, 195 what about the lawyer's own
client? Is a violation of the Code prima facie evidence of
negligence by the attorney? This question was answered in the
negative in Brainard v. Brown,i 96 where the plaintiff sued his

former attorney for negligence in drafting a security agreement in
connection with the transfer of real estate and construction
equipment from the plaintiff to an excavating concern.197 The
plaintiff contended, inter alia, that the defendant committed

malpractice both in the drafting of the agreement and in a conflict
of interest by simultaneously representing both the seller and
buyer. 19 8 In rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the alleged

violation of the Code gave rise to a cause of action for breach of
contract, the Appellate Division observed that:

"A purported

violation of a disciplinary rule does not, in itself, generate a cause
of action." 199 This principle has similarly been applied to bar a
malpractice claim based upon an alleged violation of the Code in
the First20 and Second20 1 Departments.
'9'Shapiro, 92 N.Y.2d at 97, 677 N.Y.S.2d at 50.
196 91 A.D.2d 287, 458 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dept 1983), overruled on other
grounds, Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 164 A.D.2d 149, 563
N.Y.S.2d
548 (3d Dept 1990).
197Brainard, 91 A.D.2d at 287, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 736.
198

Id.

199 91 A.D.2d at 289, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 736. Accord, Lavanant v. General
Accident Ins. Co., 212 A.D.2d 450, 622 N.Y.S2d 726 (1st Dept 1995)
("Their claims of conflict of interest, even if a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, would not support a separate cause of action for
punitive damages."); Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.D.2d 271 (N.J. 1998); Perillo,
supra, 67 Fordham L. Rev. at 495 f.n.75.
200 Steinberg v. Harmon, 259 A.D.2d 318, 686 N.Y.S.2d 423 (1st
Dept
1999) ("Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for legal malpractice based
solely on defendant's disqualification for an alleged conflict of interest in a
separate litigation.").
201 Brown v. Samalin & Bock, 155 A.D.2d 407, 547 N.Y.S.2d 80 (2d Dept
1989) ("However, even if the procurement of the release constituted a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as plaintiff claims, it did
not, in itself, generate a separate cause of action which might support an award
for punitive damages").
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Without referring to the foregoing authorities, the New
York County Lawyers' Association Committee on Professional
Ethics has interpreted DR 2-107 to support malpractice liability
against referring counsel based upon a hypothetical fact situation
in which the attorneys agreed in writing to assume joint
responsibility for the representation, and, further, in which
receiving counsel agreed to indemnify referring counsel for any
malpractice committed by the former.2 ° 2

The Committee

concluded, in Ethics Opinion 715, that the indemnity agreement
did not violate the Code, and went on to opine that the agreement
to assume "joint responsibility" is financial as well as moral. 203
While referring counsel has no obligation to supervise the work
of a specialist, counsel should be prepared to indemnify the client
for the former's malpractice because, in the view of the
Committee, "joint204responsibility is synonymous with joint and
several liability."
Interestingly, the Committee's conclusion states that a
lawyer who agrees to share fees for a referral "is ethically
obligated to accept vicarious liability for any act of malpractice
that occurs during the course of the representation., 20 5 The
Committee seems to be enunciating an exhortatory principle for
the guidance of the ethical attorney: An ethical attorney who
refers a client to a specialist who commits malpractice should do
the noble thing and agree to make the client whole financially.20 6
But whether a court can take these noble sentiments and convert
them into a cause of action for money damages is another
question altogether, particularly in light of the prohibitions in
Drago and the Preliminary Statement to the Code itself on
deriving such a cause of action.20 7
202 NYCLA

Ethics Op. 715, 1996 WL 592658 (May 28, 1996).
Id. at *3 (While a referring lawyer may have a financial obligation of
'joint responsibility,' that liability does not lead to an ethical obligation of the
attorney
to supervise the lawyer who accepted the case).
204
203

id.

Id. (Apparently, the attorney is ethically obligated to accept financial
responsibility.).
20
6id.
2°7Drago,
46 N.Y.2d at 779, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 911. See also supra note 15.
205
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Moreover, the scope of Ethics Opinion 715 is limited to
interpreting the language of a hypothetical written agreement
among attorneys to share responsibility for receiving counsel's
208 The opinion does not address the
representation of the client. 20
situation in which the attorneys, either through neglect or
ignorance, simply fail to have such an agreement. While such a
failure may be unethical, it does not thereby become civilly
actionable.
Under Ethics Opinion 715, an attorney who wishes to
make a referral has several options. He can: (a) keep the matter
himself, consistent with his professional obligation to provide
competent legal representation; (b) refer the case out without
accepting any fee; (c) accept compensation in proportion to the
work actually performed, or (d) accept a referral fee along with a
written fee agreement acknowledged by the client. 20 9 Under the
last alternative, referring counsel may, at least in New York
County, ethically extract an indemnification agreement from
receiving counsel and may inquire about the status of receiving
counsel's malpractice insurance.
However, the insurance
coverage existing on the date of the referral may not be in effect
on the date of the malpractice, e.g., two years later.21 '
Along these lines, it is noteworthy that a Florida appellate
court has recently held that a referring attorney may be held
civilly liable for the malpractice of receiving counsel, even
without an agreement to assume joint responsibility, where there
is "an express or implied agreement to divide the fee.", 212 The
defendant in Norris v. Silver 213 was a Florida lawyer who
referred a personal injury case arising out of an Illinois accident
to an Illinois attorney, who neglected to commence suit within the
two year Illinois statute of limitations.21 4 There was no written

208

1996 WL 592658.

2

09id.

2 10

2 11
212

213
214

/d.

id.
Norris v. Silver, 701 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 1.
1239.
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agreement between the two attorneys concerning their fees or
assuming joint responsibility for the representation. 215
Although the trial court had granted summary judgment in
favor of referring counsel, the District Court of Appeal reversed,
finding the existence of "a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether [referring counsel] retained a financial interest in
plaintiff's personal injury case by entering into an express or
implied agreement to divide the legal fee." 21 6 The court reasoned
that liability can be derived from a written agreement assuming
joint liability for the representation, as required by the Rules
Regulating the Florida Bar, which are roughly analogous, but not
identical, to the language of DR 2-107 of the Code. 217 In
Florida, fees may be shared among attorneys in proportion to
actual services performed or, by written agreement in which
"each lawyer assumes joint legal responsibility for the
representation and agrees to be available for consultation with the
218 Although, under Florida law, the failure to put the
client ....
referral agreement in writing rendered it unenforceable, the court
reasoned that equity and fairness required that counsel not be
rewarded for his failure to comply with the state ethics rules.219
The court held that vicarious liability can be derived from an
express or implied agreement to divide the legal fee, yet
cautioned:
It would not, however, be enough for the
plaintiff simply to show that the working attorney
had a unilateral, subjective intent to pay a referral
fee ....The fact that the
215
216
217

working attorney

id.
Id. at 1240.

Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.5(g) (2001). The statute provides in part that a

division of fees can be allocated either in proportion to the services performed
by each lawyer, or, "by written agreement with the client; (A) each lawyer
assumes joint responsibility for the representation and agrees to be available
for consultation with the client; and (B) the agreement fully discloses that a
division of fees will be made and the basis upon which the division of fees will
be2 18made."
id.

219 Norris,

701 So.2d at 1240.
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routinely pays referral fees is not, in and of itself,
enough to establish an agreement between the
referring and the working attorney. Plaintiff must
prove an express or implied agreement to divide
220
the fee.
Norris is unlikely to be persuasive in New York for a
variety of reasons. First, it is based upon an ethical framework
somewhat different than DR 2-107.
Florida's ethical rules
require a referring attorney either: (a) to accept a fee in
proportion to the work actually performed, or (b) to assume joint
responsibility and "to be available for consultation with the
client. 22 The Norris court never even considered the argument
that the work performed by receiving counsel, while modest,
might have entitled him to a fee. 222 Yet that is the rule in New
York; as long as referring counsel performs some work, he will
be entitled to enforcement of the referral agreement provided
"there is no claim that either refused to contribute more
substantially." 223 The New York courts, mindful of the realities
of the everyday practice of law, have been loathe to look behind
referral agreements and have accordingly interpreted the
"proportion to the services performed" prong of DR 2-107 so
broadly as to obviate the type of analysis employed in Norris.224
The result of Norris seems harsh: How can a Florida
practitioner be held liable for the negligence of an Illinois lawyer
in missing an Illinois statute of limitations in a case arising out of
an Illinois accident? Moreover, a line of New York cases, going
back to Wildermann,22 5 have held that referring counsel is not
responsible for the negligence of foreign counsel. Indeed, in
Wildermann, referring counsel expected to share in any recovery
obtained by Pennsylvania counsel on a contingency fee basis.226
220

Id. at 1241.

Fla. Bar Reg. R. 4-1.5(g).
Norris, 701 So.2d at 1241.
223 Benjamin, 85 N.Y. 2d at 556, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
22,

222

224 id.
225

149 Misc. at 263, 267 N.Y.S. at 840.

226

ld. at 841.
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Even if a referring attorney somehow fails to furnish any
legal services within the broad net cast by the New York Court of
Appeals, the Code of Professional Responsibility should not, as a
matter of policy, be used as a vehicle for imposing professional
liability upon referring counsel. As mentioned, the purpose of
the Code is to regulate and set standards for ethical behavior, not
to govern civil liability.227 As a matter of policy, referrals to more
competent or specialized attorneys serve the public interest and
advance the goals of the Code by making experienced counsel
available to the lay public. Clients are generally served by a
system which encourages referrals to specialists. Given the
increasing complexity of the law, a client, particularly a business
entity, may require the services of a variety of legal specialists.
While the law does not permit a naked finder's fee, it conversely
should not penalize a lawyer economically for seeking the advice
or services of a specialist.
Given the foregoing, it seems anomalous to render a
referring lawyer, who is generally only responsible for her own
lack of ordinary care in her own legal practice, absolutely liable
as a guarantor of any specialist she recommends to a client.
Look at the result in Norris: a Florida lawyer who referred an
Illinois case to an Illinois lawyer without an explicit agreement to
share fees may be held absolutely liable for the latter's negligent
oversight of an Illinois statute. 228 After Norris,229 a Florida
lawyer is likely to think long and hard before referring a case to
an out-of-state practitioner, with or without a fee. A New York
lawyer presented with the opportunity to refer a case to a Florida
colleague, may well decide that the risks outweigh the benefits,
and simply walk away.23°
Such a scenario would provide an economic disincentive
to making referrals to specialists or out-of-state attorneys. Some
attorneys would devote the time and effort to investigating the
227 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
228 Norris, 701 So.2d at 1241.
229

Preliminary Statement.

id.

In addition, an interstate referral may result in choice of law problems,
which amplify the uncertainties of attorney liability.
230
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backgrounds and insurance coverage of receiving counsel, and
would be more likely to enter into written fee-sharing
agreements, perhaps even requiring an indemnity agreement
along the lines of Ethics Opinion 715.231 This development
would be time-consuming and expensive, yet potentially
beneficial in reducing uncompensated claims. Other attorneys,
due to economic constraints, might feel pressured into holding
onto matters that they otherwise would and should have referred
to specialists. This could have the potential effect of giving rise
to more malpractice. Further, the delays and confusion caused
by attorneys investigating and negotiating agreements with each
other would be accompanied by a price tag, as they would be
forced to allocate limited time and resources away from other
clients and matters.
On the other hand, it is logical to shift the risk of loss
from the innocent lay victims of legal malpractice to the lawyer
who steered them to the incompetent specialist in the first place.
This is particularly the case where referring counsel expects to
receive an attorney's fee for doing little or no work, the situation
addressed in Norris.232 If referring counsel expects to share in
the fee, why should he not share in compensating the client in the
event of legal malpractice?
Yet imposing strict liability on referring counsel for the
misconduct of receiving counsel can be inherently unfair,
particularly where counsel's liability is disproportionate to his
own fault in making the referral or misjudging the
professionalism of receiving counsel. While not insuring against
ordinary malpractice or negligence, the Lawyer's Fund for Client
Protection provides some level of reimbursement to clients who
have lost money or property as a result of fraud, theft or
conversion by their attorneys.233
The most reasonable approach, it seems, is to judge a
referral by the standard of ordinary care, and not to render
231

1996 WL 592658.

232 701 So.2d at 1241.
233

See, Caher, Lawyers Stealing Less, Clients Say, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 19, 1999,

page 1. f.n. 167 p. 34.
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referring counsel the guarantor of receiving counsel's
professionalism. This middle-ground approach eschews the
absolute liability proposed by Norris and Ethics Opinion 715.23
Yet it is consistent with Wildermann and the New Jersey rule
explicated in Tormo.235 For example, referring counsel may be
aware of receiving counsel's litigation prowess, but unaware of
his or her counseling skills or responsiveness in returning
telephone calls.
Receiving counsel may be a tiger in the
courtroom but a dud in the library, or vice-versa. Under this
approach, those attorneys who actively assume a supervisory role
over receiving counsel, or who make affirmative factual
representations about the latter's work, should be held to the
standard of ordinary care. Rather than becoming the guarantor of
the legal work of receiving counsel, referring counsel should be
held responsible in proportion to his actual negligence.
VI. CONCLUSION

A referring attorney is required to use due care in the
selection of outside counsel to whom he entrusts a client's legal
business. 236 This being said, the standard of due care is actually
quite minimal, and there has been no reported decision in New
York finding a violation of this standard. Indeed, even under the
liberal, expansive standard enunciated in New Jersey under
Tormo, the duty of investigation into the background of receiving
counsel is discharged by simply ensuring that the receiving
237
attorney is in fact licensed to practice law in that jurisdiction.
The fact that the receiving attorney in Tormo had actually been
indicted for insurance fraud was not chargeable to referring
counsel.238 However, referring counsel must use reasonable
diligence to investigate any known irregularities or obvious
234

235

Norris, 701 So.2d at 1241. See also NYCLA Ethics Op. 715.
398 F. Supp. at 1170-1171; Wildermann at 624-25, 267 N.Y.S. at 842.

See discussion, supra, Sections II and IV.
236 Wildermann at 624-25, 267 N.Y.S. at 842.
237 Tormo, 398 F. Supp at 1171.
238 Id.
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questionable conduct on the part of the receiving counsel that
could cast doubt on her competence or professionalism.239
No duty to supervise receiving counsel arises, at least in
New York, simply by virtue of the referral. 240 Nor should an
obligation be imposed by the acceptance of an attorney's fee or an
agreement to share fees with receiving counsel, provided counsel
does some work on the case. 2 4 1 However, the possibility has
been left open by the courts that a referring attorney could, by
conduct or express representations, assume a duty to supervise
the legal work of out-of-state or specialty counsel. While we
know that reviewing correspondence and memoranda from
receiving counsel will not, in and of itself, give rise to liability
for their negligence in New York, the courts have not delineated
when referring counsel's services will cross the line between
functioning as "general counsel" and undertaking to supervise the
work of outside counsel. Thus, counsel must be vigilant in
clearly communicating with the client the precise scope of
representation and supervisory authority over receiving counsel.
While a lawyer cannot ethically limit her liability to her
242
client,
she may ethically require receiving counsel to enter into
an agreement indemnifying her for the latter's malpractice. 243 In
addition, it cannot hurt to ensure that receiving counsel, in
addition to possessing the highest standards of professionalism
and expertise in his field, is also up-to-date on his errors and
omissions insurance.
While no reported decision in New York has derived a
legal malpractice case from a violation of DR 2-107, and, indeed,
there are many reasons why such a decision would be anathema
239

id.

CVC Capital Corp. v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 192 A.D.2d 324, 595
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1993).
241 But see, NYCLA Ethics Opinion 715, discussed in Section IV, supra.
242 See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-102, codified as 22
240

N.Y.C.R.R. 1200.31 (McKinney's 1992 & Supp. 2001) ("A lawyer shall not
seek, by contract or other means to limit prospectively the lawyer's individual
liability to a client for malpractice ... ).
243 See, Comment, "Legal Malpractice" Negligent Referral As A Cause of
Action, 29 Cumb. L. Rev. 697, 702 (1998); Ethics Op. 715.
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to New York jurisprudence, there is no reason to tempt the fates
in this regard. Indeed, the principles enunciated in Norris and
Ethics Opinion 715, while not native to New York soil, have not
Counsel should take
been explicitly rejected here either.
guidance not only from the authorities discussed in this article,
but from the letter and spirit of the Code of Professional
Successfully defending a legal
Responsibility as well.
malpractice claim may be of fleeting consolation to an attorney
whose livelihood is challenged by a disciplinary proceeding
arising out of a violation of DR 2-107. Perhaps the best way for
a lawyer to comply with standards of ordinary competence is to
aspire to something higher.
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